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EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION 
Ernest A. Young* 
INTRODUCTION 
Preemption of state regulatory authority by national law is the central 
federalism issue of our time.  Most analysis of this issue has focused on the 
preemptive effects of federal statutes.  But as Justice White observed in INS 
v. Chadha,1 “[f]or some time, the sheer amount of law . . . made by the 
[administrative] agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in 
by Congress through the traditional process.”2  Whether one views this de-
velopment as a “bloodless constitutional revolution”3 or as a necessary 
“renovation” of the constitutional structure in response to the complexity of 
modern society,4 the advent of the administrative state has profound impli-
cations for the Constitution’s core commitments to federalism and separa-
tion of powers in general and for preemption doctrine in particular.  
Specifically, preemption doctrine has yet to resolve the extent to which ex-
ecutive action should be treated differently from legislation, or to grapple 
with the considerable range of diverse governmental activities that march 
under the banner of executive agency action. 
Federal administrative action is, in important ways, considerably more 
threatening to state autonomy than legislation is.  As the constitutional lim-
its on national action fade into history, the primary remaining safeguards 
for state autonomy are political, stemming from the representation of the 
states in Congress, and procedural, arising from the sheer difficulty of navi-
gating the federal legislative process.  These safeguards have little purchase 
on executive action.  The states have no direct role in the “composition and 
 
*  Professor of Law, Duke Law School.  This Article is a contribution to the Northwestern University 
Law Review Symposium on “Ordering State-Federal Relations Through Federal Preemption Doctrine” 
held on April 5, 2007.  I am grateful to David Dana for the invitation to participate, to Stuart Benjamin 
and John Golden for helpful comments, and to Elizabeth McKee and Matt Swinehart for valuable re-
search assistance. 
1  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
2  Id. at 985–86 (White, J., dissenting). 
3  Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 
(1994). 
4  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY 
STATE 227 (1990). 
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selection” of federal administrative agencies,5 and much of the point of such 
agencies is to be more efficient lawmakers than Congress.6  Agency action 
thus evades both the political and the procedural safeguards of federalism. 
It remains true, of course, that “an agency literally has no power to act, 
let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, un-
less and until Congress confers power upon it.”7  But as Colin Diver ob-
serves, “a defining characteristic of the administrative state [is] that most 
statutes are not direct commands to the public enforced exclusively by 
courts, but are delegations to administrative agencies to issue and enforce 
such commands.”8  Preemption doctrine has developed primarily as a doc-
trine of statutory construction, focused on the intent of Congress, and trans-
porting that doctrine into the administrative law context raises a number of 
difficult problems of translation.  The Supreme Court’s preemption juris-
prudence, unfortunately, has tended to ignore these problems.  Instead of 
structuring preemption doctrine to account for the distinct position and 
characteristics of administrative agencies, the Court has tended to say sim-
ply that “[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal 
statutes.”9 
I try to do a little better than that in this Article by addressing two basic 
sets of problems.  The first involves questions of interpretation arising from 
an agency’s determination that congressional action has preemptive effect.  
The most prominent issue here is whether, where Congress’s own preemp-
tive intent is ambiguous, courts should defer to the agency’s conclusion that 
a statute preempts state law under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council.10  Such deference would create an important ex-
ception to the normal presumption articulated most famously in Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp. that statutory ambiguity is resolved in favor of 
preserving state regulatory authority.11  I argue that although courts may 
continue to defer to agency interpretations of what the relevant statute does, 
 
5  See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Com-
position and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
6  See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Pro-
fessor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 404 (1987) (“Given the nature and level of government intervention 
that Congress now authorizes, it could not possibly make the hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of impor-
tant policy decisions that agencies make annually.”). 
7  La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). 
8  Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 
(1985). 
9  Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).  See generally Paul E. 
McGreal, Some Rice With Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 
45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 826 (1995) (complaining that “the Court merely has applied statutory 
preemption rules to regulatory preemption cases” without reflecting on the differences between Con-
gress and the agencies). 
10  467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
11  331 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1947).  
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Chevron should not be construed to require similar deference to agency 
conclusions about the law’s preemptive effect.12 
The second set of issues arises when preemption is asserted on the ba-
sis of regulations, orders, or other agency activity, rather than grounded in 
the relevant statute itself.  These instances of preemption are problematic 
because they seem to shift preemptive authority from Congress to the 
agency—a result that contravenes both the text of the Supremacy Clause 
and the structural safeguards of federalism and separation of powers.  As a 
result, I suggest that we may wish to restrict the agencies’ role in preemp-
tion to interpreting what Congress has done.  Failing that, however, I sug-
gest a series of possible limiting principles, each of which would restrict 
administrative preemption to at least some extent beyond present law. 
My discussion proceeds in three parts.  Part I offers a brief account of 
preemption doctrine and situates the issue of executive preemption within 
that account.  Part II addresses the question of statutory interpretation and 
deference.  Part III then turns to the independent preemptive force of 
agency action. 
I. EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM DOCTRINE 
An important and intuitively appealing genre of preemption scholar-
ship seeks to allocate regulatory authority among national and state gov-
ernmental institutions so as to achieve optimal regulation, as measured by 
the goals of the overall regulatory scheme.  This is the approach that my 
friend Catherine Sharkey takes, for example, in her recent work on products 
liability preemption.13  My perspective is considerably different and, as a re-
sult, requires brief elaboration.  I view preemption doctrine not as a tool of 
regulatory policy but rather as the most significant contemporary manifesta-
tion of what Justice O’Connor describes as “our oldest question of constitu-
tional law”—that is, “the proper division of authority between the Federal 
Government and the States.”14  Although the policy concerns of efficiency, 
safety, and the like inherent in particular regulatory schemes are hardly ir-
relevant to the decision of individual preemption cases, the general rules of 
preemption doctrine—such as the preemptive effect of executive action—
should be set with an eye firmly focused on the constitutional imperatives 
of federalism doctrine. 
 
12  For a similar argument, see Damien J. Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in 
Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263 (1998).  
13  See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV 449 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption]; Catherine M. 
Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 841, 862–66 (2008) [hereinafter 
Sharkey, Fraud Caveat]. 
14  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
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At the core of that doctrine is a general commitment to balance be-
tween national and state authority.15  That commitment is grounded not in 
the capacity of federalism to promote various policy values—although I be-
lieve that it does promote such values16—but rather in constitutional fidel-
ity.17  The federal balance has shifted over time, as has the role of the courts 
in seeking to maintain it.  In the early Republic, the Marshall Court acted to 
shore up a fledgling national government by curbing centrifugal impulses in 
the states.18  In the present time, by contrast, the center of gravity has 
plainly shifted to the national government, and the courts’ obligation, ac-
cordingly, is to protect a meaningful role for the states.19  Fidelity to the 
Constitution thus requires courts to make compensating doctrinal adjust-
ments in the direction of limiting national power, even if the institutional 
limitations of courts and the uncertainty of locating any fixed ideal point 
make “restoring” the original balance unlikely.20 
 
15  See generally Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, 
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1764–71 (2005) [hereinafter Young, 
Making Federalism Doctrine]. 
16  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997). 
17  See New York, 505 U.S. at 157 (“Our task would be the same even if one could prove that feder-
alism secured no advantages to anyone.  It consists not of devising our preferred system of government, 
but of understanding and applying the framework set forth in the Constitution.”).  To be sure, the Consti-
tution does not set forth specific rules for executive preemption or any number of other contemporary 
federalism issues, and where there is play in the joints, other values—such as efficiency—become rele-
vant.  But I do insist that the ultimate question must remain how to preserve and enforce the basic fed-
eral balance embodied in the Constitution, not whether other institutional forms might be better.  Stuart 
Benjamin and I have defended this constitutionalist orientation in the specific context of administration 
elsewhere.  See Stuart M. Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Fed-
eralism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2008).  For the contrary view that administrative 
federalism doctrine should focus on achieving an optimal regulatory structure for today, see Brian D. 
Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Admin Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge 
of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2008).  See also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Un-
derlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (arguing that authority should 
be allocated between federal agencies and state regulators so as to create optimal incentives for regula-
tory innovation and expertise). 
18  See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436–37 (1819) (holding that Maryland 
lacked authority to tax the Bank of the United States); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239–240 
(1824) (invalidating New York’s attempt to grant an exclusive license to operate a ferry in interstate 
commerce).  See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 17 (4th ed. 
2005) (“From 1789 until the Civil War, the dominant interest of the Supreme Court was in . . . the na-
tion-state relationship.  And the dominant judicial value . . . was the value of preserving the American 
Union.”). 
19  The modern Court has recognized this obligation only sporadically.  For two examples, see 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995), which held that the federal Gun Free School 
Zones Act exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, and Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 935 (1997), which held that Congress may not “commandeer” state executive officials by re-
quiring them to enforce federal law. 
20  See Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 15, at 1775–1815. 
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Preemption doctrine is a particularly important vehicle for promoting 
balance between national and state authority.21  Although the fact is fre-
quently overlooked, preemption played a crucial role in the Marshall 
Court’s early federalism cases.  Gibbons v. Ogden held that New York’s ef-
fort to grant an exclusive steamship license under state law was preempted 
by Congress’s grant of a federal license to a competitor.22  And in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, the Court held Maryland’s tax on out-of-state banks pre-
empted on the ground that it interfered with the federal policy embodied in 
the National Bank Act.23  For most of the next century, however, preemp-
tion doctrine took a back seat to the Court’s effort to define and police a 
constitutional boundary, primarily under the Commerce Clause, between 
exclusive spheres of national and state power.  In a world of exclusive regu-
latory spheres, federal and state laws do not generally interact in the same 
regulatory space (at least in theory), and preemption issues as we now know 
them arise only rarely.24   
The collapse of this “dual federalism” regime after 1937,25 however, 
means that, as a practical matter, the national and state governments enjoy 
concurrent regulatory authority over most issues.  Such a concurrent regime 
vastly magnifies the potential for clashes between state and federal regula-
tion.  As Stephen Gardbaum notes, the Supreme Court accorded broad pre-
emptive effect to federal legislation within the relatively narrow sphere 
allowed by the pre-1937 Commerce Clause; once Congress’s potential au-
thority expanded to cover most areas of state regulation, however, the Court 
came to define the preemptive effect of federal legislation much more nar-
 
21  See generally Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve 
eds., 2007) [hereinafter Young, Federal Preemption]; David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Fed-
eral Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 507 (2008) (“[H]ow the federal courts respond to preemption 
challenges affects how vibrant a role the states can have in democratic governance, and thus affects how 
vibrant a role the people . . . can have in democratic governance.”). 
22  See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 220–21. 
23  See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.  Both McCulloch and Gibbons involved the supremacy effect of 
federal law—i.e., the fact that federal law trumps state law in the event of a conflict.  Stephen Gardbaum 
has drawn a sharp line between that effect and Congress’s power to displace state law in the absence of 
such a conflict.  See generally Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. 
REV. 39 (2005).  Although I find that distinction useful for some purposes, in this Essay I will follow 
conventional usage in referring to both phenomena as “preemption.” 
24  See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 785 (1994) 
(“For most of the nineteenth century, the Court typically decided cases involving the relationship be-
tween state and federal power not on preemption grounds, but on grounds of exclusivity or supremacy 
alone.”). 
25  See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (ending an era of relatively 
strict judicial enforcement of enumerated limits on national authority by upholding the Wagner Act); 
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1950) (describing the system 
of “dual federalism,” which postulated a sharp and enforceable division of enumerated authority be-
tween the nation and the states, and observing that “[t]his entire system of constitutional interpretation 
touching the Federal System is today in ruins” after 1937). 
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rowly.26  Without meaningful constitutional limits on national authority, 
moreover, the effective “boundary” between state and national spheres con-
sists largely of the limits of the regulatory schemes erected by Congress.27  
It thus becomes terribly important to determine how much regulatory terri-
tory Congress has appropriated for itself and how much it has left to the 
states.  This is a question of statutory construction, and it is the issue at the 
heart of every preemption case.28 
The Rehnquist Court’s “federalist revival” did little to alter this situa-
tion.  Recent cases striking federal legislation as outside the commerce 
power have sought simply to prevent the doctrine of enumerated powers 
from disappearing entirely, not to revive that doctrine as a significant check 
on the mainstream of federal regulation.29  Some critics of doctrines limiting 
preemption suggest that the Court should focus on limiting the authority of 
Congress more directly, through restrictive constructions of the Commerce 
Clause and other national powers.30  But for any number of reasons—such 
as the Court’s historical failure to develop coherent limits on the commerce 
power,31 the sheer weight of all the national statutes and institutions estab-
 
26  See Gardbaum, supra note 24, at 801–07.  This shift is the genesis of the modern “presumption 
against preemption.”  See id. at 806–07; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–31 
(1947) (articulating this presumption). 
27  See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 
(2007) (discussing the importance of statutes in defining the boundary between state and federal author-
ity). 
28  Justice Breyer captured this dynamic in his dissent in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff: 
[T]he Court has recognized the practical importance of preserving local independence, at retail, 
i.e., by applying pre-emption analysis with care, statute by statute, line by line, in order to deter-
mine how best to reconcile a federal statute’s language and purpose with federalism’s need to pre-
serve state autonomy.  Indeed, in today’s world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of 
federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional constitutional effort to trim Congress’ commerce 
power at its edges, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), or to protect a State’s treasury 
from a private damages action, Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), 
but rather in those many statutory cases where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is 
the ordinary diet of the law, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 427 (1999). 
532 U.S. 141, 160–61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
29  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones 
Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down portions of the Violence Against 
Women Act).   
30  See, e.g., Viet Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2117 (2000) (“Rede-
fining the proper balance of legislative powers between Congress and the states is better accomplished 
directly, through an insistence on the limits of Congress’s enumerated and limited powers under Article 
I, rather than circuitously and ineffectually through some vague and ill-conceived presumption against 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause.”). 
31  See, e.g., Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A 
Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1462 (1995) (“Each line of 
cases described in this part (constitutional limits on federal regulation, constitutional limits on federal 
regulation of the states, and constitutional limits on state regulation) might be characterized as internally 
incoherent—shifting directions erratically and containing hard-to-explain inconsistencies over time.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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lished in reliance on a broad Commerce Clause,32 and the ultimate alle-
giance of the federal courts to federal power33—the Supreme Court is 
unlikely ever to limit the Commerce Clause in a very meaningful way.34  
Preemption doctrine offers a much more viable avenue for protecting state 
autonomy without disrupting settled law or providing damaging judicial 
confrontations with Congress.35 
The “federalist revival” has been disappointing on this score.  The 
Rehnquist Court held state law preempted more often than not, and ironi-
cally the politically conservative leaders of that revival tended to abandon 
the cause when litigation shifted from the Commerce Clause and the Elev-
enth Amendment to matters of statutory preemption.36  The early Roberts 
Court has largely continued this pro-preemption stance, with decisions that 
are sometimes remarkably insensitive to legitimate concerns for state regu-
latory autonomy.  Its recent decision in Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor 
Transport Ass’n,37 for example, continued the Court’s crusade against state 
efforts to protect children from tobacco.38  Federal law deregulates the 
trucking business and preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or ser-
vice of any motor carrier.”39  Rowe held that this provision preempted a 
Maine law requiring shippers to verify that persons receiving tobacco ship-
ments were old enough to use tobacco legally—notwithstanding that Con-
gress’s primary concerns were with state economic regulation directed at 
the trucking industry itself and that Congress had affirmatively encouraged 
the states to regulate tobacco use by minors.40  Justice Breyer’s opinion for 
 
32  See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 745 (1988) (concluding that “many of the fundamental transformations in our governmental 
structure legitimated by the Supreme Court in this century are unquestionably above challenge”). 
33  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1315–20 (1999) 
(arguing that because federal judges are officers of the federal government, they have strong incentives 
to favor national over state authority).   
34  Any doubt on this score should have been resolved by the Court’s subsequent decision upholding 
Congress’s authority to regulate the noncommercial use of marijuana grown and consumed within a sin-
gle state.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  For an assessment of Raich, see Ernest A. Young, 
Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival after Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1 [hereinafter Young, Blowing Smoke]. 
35  See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130–34 (2004) 
[hereinafter Young, Two Federalisms]. 
36  See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Feder-
alism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462 (2002); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist 
Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 502–12 (2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passiv-
ity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 362–78; Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 35, at 30–32. 
37  128 S. Ct. 989 (2008). 
38  See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (holding that federal law requiring 
warning labels on cigarette packages preempted a Massachusetts law forbidding sign and poster adver-
tising of tobacco produces near schools). 
39  49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2000). 
40  See Rowe, 128 S. Ct. at 999 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that Congress had provided fund-
ing incentives for state regulation of tobacco sales to minors, and that Internet sales make such regula-
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the Court made short work of Maine’s public health concerns, finding that 
health regulation would simply make the world too complicated for truck-
ing companies.41   
Nonetheless, preemption doctrine retains significant potential as a ve-
hicle for protecting state autonomy.  In a world of concurrent regulatory au-
thority, the primary protections for state autonomy are political and 
procedural.  The political safeguard is the representation of the states in 
Congress.42  Although there are all sorts of reasons to question the efficacy 
of this safeguard, it seems to operate to some effect, some of the time.43  
The procedural safeguard, on the other hand, lies in the sheer difficulty of 
getting proposals on the national legislative agenda and then pushing them 
through the multiple veto gates of approval by two houses of Congress and 
the President.44  The critical variables when the national government acts in 
a way that may intrude on state autonomy are thus the clarity of the action 
(so that potential defenders of state interests are aware of the threat and can 
respond to it), the particular national institution that acts (which determines 
the extent to which state advocates have a voice in that action), and the dif-
ficulty of the procedure by which the action is taken (because national iner-
tia favors state autonomy). 
Consider, for example, the classic preemption case in which an am-
biguous federal statute must be construed to determine whether it preempts 
state law.  The somewhat beleaguered centerpiece of current doctrine is the 
“presumption against preemption,” which holds that “the historic police 
                                                                                                                           
tion difficult without age verification by shippers).  Justice Ginsburg “doubt[ed] that the drafters of the 
[Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994], a statute designed to regulate the carriage 
of goods, anticipated the measure’s facilitation of minors’ access to tobacco,” id., but deferred to “the 
breadth of [the Act]’s preemption language” and prior decisions “closely in point.”  Id. at 998 (citing 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 
(1995)).  
41  See id. at 997 (majority opinion) (“[T]o allow Maine directly to regulate carrier services would 
permit other States to do the same.  Given the number of States through which carriers travel, the num-
ber of products, the variety of potential adverse public health effects, the many different kinds of regula-
tory rules potentially available, and the difficulty of finding a legal criterion for separating permissible 
from impermissible public-health-oriented regulations, Congress is unlikely to have intended an implicit 
general ‘public health’ exception broad enough to cover even the shipments at issue here.”).  Note the 
scare quotes in the original around Maine’s “public health” rationale. 
42  See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 5.  For an earlier version, see THE FEDERALIST NOS. 45, 46 
(James Madison) (noting the states’ institutional representation in Congress, but emphasizing the 
broader competition between the states and the national government for the loyalty of the people). 
43  Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 564–67 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s “political safeguards” argument), and Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. 
Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 106–33 (2001) (col-
lecting arguments against exclusive reliance on political safeguards to protect federalism), with Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 957–58 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the Unfunded Mandates Re-
form Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, as evidence that Congress acts to protect the interests 
of state governments). 
44  See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321 (2001). 
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powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”45  The effect of this 
clear statement rule is to ensure notice that state interests are threatened by 
proposed legislation, to oblige Congress to make the preemption decision 
itself rather than leaving it to a court to determine by implication, and to re-
quire that an explicit preemption decision survive the difficult enactment 
procedure for statutory text.46  The efficacy of these requirements in safe-
guarding state autonomy can be readily confirmed simply by looking to the 
number of significant preemption cases in which they are not satisfied, 
leaving the courts to rely upon more amorphous notions of implied conflict 
preemption.47  Consistent enforcement of the presumption against preemp-
tion would require upholding state regulation in this large category of cases; 
it seems likely, as a result, that such enforcement would be a far more 
meaningful check on expansions of national regulatory authority at the ex-
 
45  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1947).  Commentators have criticized the 
presumption against preemption, see, e.g., Dinh, supra note 30, at 2087–97 (arguing that the presump-
tion is illegitimate because it may generate results contrary to the most likely intent of Congress); Caleb 
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 235–44 (2000) (arguing that the presumption is inconsistent 
with the original understanding of the Supremacy Clause), and important debates are in progress con-
cerning its scope, compare, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 103–04 (2000) (suggesting that 
the presumption applies only in areas of traditional state regulatory authority), with Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the presumption applies “in all pre-
emption cases”).  These debates are largely outside the scope of this Article.  My short answers, devel-
oped at greater length elsewhere, are that the presumption is a normative canon of construction that pro-
tects constitutional federalism values rather than seeking to gauge the unexpressed intent of Congress 
with regard to particular statutes, see Young, Federal Preemption, supra note 21, at 265; Ernest A. 
Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. 
L. REV. 1549, 1585–99 (2000) (defending normative canons of construction) [hereinafter Young, Con-
stitutional Avoidance]; that this canon is legitimate, notwithstanding its inconsistency with the Framers’ 
original strategy for protecting federalism, as a judicial compensating adjustment to reflect the demise of 
the enumerated powers and dual federalism doctrines, see Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra 
note 15, at 1848–50; and that the presumption should not be confined to particular fields because it is 
virtually impossible to define spheres of traditional state or federal regulatory authority in a consistent 
and principled way, see Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign 
Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Dual Federalism]. 
46  See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial 
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Fall 2008) (describing how 
clear statement rules enforce constitutional values by increasing the enactment costs of particular types 
of legislation). 
47  See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–27 (2003) (holding that California’s 
Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act was preempted because it conflicted with the implicit purpose 
of a federal executive agreement with Germany, despite the lack of any federal legislation on point or 
preemptive language in the agreement itself); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–74 
(2000) (holding that the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966 preempted state tort suits, de-
spite a textual savings clause for common law actions, on the ground that the state tort suits in question 
conflicted with the purpose of federal standards); Locke, 529 U.S. at 116–17 (finding conflict preemp-
tion despite the lack of a clear statement of Congress’s preemptive intent in the statute); see also Dana, 
supra note 21, at 532–34 (discussing how preemption doctrine will determine the fate of California’s 
efforts to limit greenhouse gases). 
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pense of the states than the Court’s recent and largely symbolic efforts to 
put teeth in the Commerce Clause.48 
Executive preemption, by contrast, is particularly problematic in terms 
of all three variables that I highlight above.  When executive actors add pre-
emptive mandates not clearly set forth in the underlying statute, the notice 
and deliberation facilitated by clear textual statement is lacking.  This is 
true even if the agency proceeds by notice and comment because the delib-
eration assumed by “political safeguards” theories of federalism takes place 
among the states’ representatives in Congress, not among interest groups 
submitting comments to federal bureaucrats.  Federal agencies, after all, 
have no mandate to represent state interests and possess strong countervail-
ing incentives to maximize their own power and jurisdiction.49  Justice Ste-
vens has observed, in this vein, that “[u]nlike Congress, administrative 
agencies are clearly not designed to represent the interests of States, yet 
with relative ease they can promulgate comprehensive and detailed regula-
tions that have broad pre-emption ramifications for state law.”50  The politi-
cal and procedural safeguards of federalism are thus readily circumvented 
through executive action.  It is hardly surprising that so much federal pre-
 
48  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision 
and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 63 (“I am inclined to view Lopez less as a funda-
mental recasting of relations between nation and state than as a warning shot across the bow . . . .”). 
49  See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 794–95 (2004) 
[hereinafter Mendelson, Chevron] (“While an agency would not directly expand its own jurisdiction in 
reading an ambiguous statute to preempt state law, it could, through a preemption decision, indirectly 
lay the groundwork for an increase in the agency’s importance by making itself the primary regulator—
as a practical matter, the only game in town.  This would enable it to demand a larger budget and more 
employees in order to properly regulate the field.  Alternatively, to the extent one accepts a public 
choice view of agency regulation, an agency’s power to preempt conflicting state law would make it bet-
ter able to deliver on ‘deals’ with well-organized interest groups.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Jona-
than R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate 
Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 953–56 (2005) 
(describing political dynamics that encourage federal agencies to seek expanded jurisdiction).  But see 
Gersen, supra note 17, at 235 (suggesting that concerns about agency overreaching rest “on unproven 
background assumptions about the behavior of administrative agencies”); Daryl Levinson, Empire-
Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 922 (2005) (arguing more gener-
ally that “the risks of government self-aggrandizement” are “both exaggerated and anachronistic”).  I 
offer no empirical demonstration of agency incentives in the preemption context here.  I do think that, 
given the centrality to our constitutional structure of the idea that politicians are motivated by “ambi-
tion,” and that “the interest of the man” can be “connected with the constitutional rights of the place,” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), both the theoretical and 
empirical burdens of proof ought to lie with those who would reorient our thinking around a different set 
of assumptions.  Indeed, one is tempted to say that the steady historical expansion of federal agency au-
thority vis-à-vis the states is res ipsa loquitur. 
50  Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and 
Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 963 (1985) (observing that in the administrative state, “battles among fac-
tions are resolved not on the floors of Congress but in the hallways of bureaucracies and, ultimately, the 
chambers of federal judges” and that “[t]his system of policymaking circumvents many of the political 
safeguards that are supposed to make national policies sensitive to state and local concerns”). 
102:869  (2008) Executive Preemption 
 879 
emption now rests on executive action rather than explicit statutory com-
mand. 
One possible objection to this line of argument would hold that admin-
istrative agencies themselves form a “political safeguard of federalism.”  
Many, if not most, federal regulatory programs involve the cooperation of 
state officials in implementation.51  As Professor Larry Kramer has ob-
served, 
[T]he federal government depends . . . heavily on state officials to help admin-
ister its programs.  Realistically speaking, Congress can neither abandon these 
programs nor “fire” the states and have federal bureaucrats assume full respon-
sibility for them.  The federal government needs the states as much as the re-
verse, and this mutual dependency guarantees state officials a voice in the 
process.  Not necessarily an equal voice: because federal law is supreme and 
Congress holds the purse strings, the federal government is bound to prevail if 
push comes to shove.  But federal dependency on state administrators gives 
federal officials an incentive to see that push doesn’t come to shove, or at least 
that this happens as seldom as possible, and that means taking state interests 
into account.52 
Professor Kramer concedes that, in recent years, “the federal government 
has shown greater willingness to take matters into its own hands and admin-
ister without help from the states,”53 and his more recent work has empha-
sized the role of political parties, rather than administrators, in protecting 
federalism.54  With respect to the latter, he concludes that “while this par-
ticular safeguard may not be sufficient, standing alone, to protect the inter-
ests of state institutions, it would be a mistake to assume that it counts for 
nothing.”55 
I am willing to concede that much, but it is important to note two addi-
tional points.  First, the interrelationship of state and federal administrators 
may work to enhance national power as easily as it protects the states.  Pro-
fessor Kramer’s argument about administrators is similar to his argument 
about political parties; in both contexts, he insists that the need for state and 
national officials to work together encourages each set of officials to take 
the other’s interests into account.  It has been demonstrated, however, that 
party allegiance may cause members of Congress to put loyalty to the 
 
51  See generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federal-
ism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001). 
52  Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544 (1994); see also Men-
delson, Chevron, supra note 49, at 774–77 (making a similar point). 
53  Kramer, supra note 52, at 1544 n.142. 
54  See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278–87 (2000).  For criticism of the political parties argument, see Lynn A. 
Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 
956–72 (2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Fed-
eralism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1480–89 (2001). 
55  Kramer, supra note 52, at 1544 n.142. 
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party’s national program over their states’ autonomy interests,56 and one 
would expect a similar dynamic where state administrators sometimes “buy 
in” to the national regulatory program and do not vigorously defend state 
prerogatives.57  Second, the interaction of state and federal administration 
may have distorting effects on politics in general, and separation of powers 
in particular, at the state level.  This phenomenon has been noted in the 
European Union, where the executive branches of the member states may 
actually favor action at EU level because they control the member state’s 
representation at that level.  Centralization thus becomes a useful tool for 
circumventing opposition from the legislative or judicial branch within the 
state.58  The same dynamic may occur within the U.S. federal system—
particularly in states, like Texas, in which the executive itself is not unitary.  
State governments are not monolithic, and it is often a mistake to assume 
that one particular class of state officials will always represent the general 
autonomy interests of the state. 
To return to the basic point, preemption doctrine is a well-suited vehi-
cle for preserving federalism in a world where the national and state gov-
ernments enjoy concurrent regulatory jurisdiction rather than exclusive 
spheres of constitutional authority.  It is critical to recognize, moreover, the 
dearth of plausible alternative doctrinal instruments that might plausibly 
play this role.  The Commerce Clause is likely to prove an extremely lim-
ited vehicle going forward, and other constitutional principles—like the 
principle of state sovereign immunity that has garnered so much attention of 
late59—tend to create conflict in the federal system without effectively pro-
tecting the autonomy of the states to make their own policy choices.60  
There is a hydraulic quality to federalism doctrine: weakening one set of 
constraints on national power tends to create pressure to tighten others if the 
overall objective of meaningful balance is to be maintained.  Hence, if lim-
its on preemption are to be sacrificed in the name of greater efficiency or 
expertise, one ought to ask what other instruments are to be found to protect 
 
56  See Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
885, 893–97 (2006) (demonstrating how party allegiance to the President led Republican members of 
Congress to sacrifice the interests of their states and vote in favor of federal intervention in education, 
notwithstanding federalism-based misgivings). 
57  One might expect persons choosing to become state environmental officials, for example, to be 
more committed to environmental regulation than the public at large.  In some circumstances, such state 
officials might well view federal regulators as welcome allies against antiregulatory forces in their home 
states. 
58  See, e.g., DAVID P. CALLEO, RETHINKING EUROPE’S FUTURE 270 (2001); Giandomenico Majone, 
Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, 4 EUR. L.J. 5, 7 (1998). 
59  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730–54 (1999) (holding that Congress may not abrogate 
the states’ immunity even when suits are brought in state court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
55–73 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate the states’ immunity from private damages suits 
when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers). 
60  See generally Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 35, at 154–60 (criticizing the Court’s empha-
sis on state sovereign immunity as a vehicle for protecting federalism). 
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state autonomy.  My own view is that the preemption doctrine remains the 
best tool, and my discussion of the particularly vexing problem of executive 
preemption in the following Parts proceeds from that perspective. 
II. DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF PREEMPTIVE 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
Federal administrative agencies raise questions for preemption doctrine 
in two distinct capacities: through the agencies’ power to interpret the stat-
utes they administer, and through the agencies’ delegated authority to act in 
furtherance of the statutory scheme.  The interpretive problem, which I dis-
cuss in this Part, actually has two dimensions of its own.  The first involves 
the rules of construction to be applied by the agency itself, while the second 
concerns the proper approach that courts should take when reviewing 
agency interpretations of potentially preemptive federal statutes.   
A. Interpretation by the Agency 
Like courts, of course, executive agencies must interpret the statutes 
that they administer and enforce.  And also like courts, they will often have 
to construe the degree to which the statute in question preempts state law.  
Agencies deciding preemption issues should follow the presumption against 
preemption.61  If that presumption were a descriptive canon of construction, 
reflecting a best guess as to the enacting Congress’s likely intent,62 then an 
agency that had been involved in the statute’s drafting might have a plausi-
ble argument for ignoring the Rice presumption.63  But Rice is best defended 
as a normative canon protecting constitutional values of federalism apart 
from Congress’s intent in drafting the statute at issue.64  The argument, in a 
nutshell, is that any interpreter needs some sort of default principle in the 
face of statutory ambiguity, and when constitutional norms are otherwise 
underenforced, normative canons of statutory construction are an appealing 
way to mitigate that enforcement gap.65  Nothing in this argument for feder-
alism-protecting canons of construction suggests that those canons should 
be applied only by courts; indeed, the likelihood that many agency interpre-
 
61  Sometimes they do.  See, e.g., Air Pollution Control; Preemption of State Regulation for Nonroad 
Engine and Vehicle Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,969, 36,974 (July 20, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85 
(1995)). 
62  See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Con-
struction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 749 (1992) (describing “descriptive canons” as 
“implement[ing] what Congress really wanted, but expressed inartfully or incompletely”). 
63  See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192–93 (1969) (courts should defer to agency construc-
tion of ambiguous acts that the agency participated in drafting). 
64  See Rodriguez, supra note 62, at 749 (“[N]ormative canons may or may not coincide with legisla-
tors’ values or intentions.”). 
65  See Young, Federal Preemption, supra note 21, at 264–67; see also Young, Constitutional 
Avoidance, supra note 45, at 1593–1601 (arguing for the general legitimacy of normative canons of con-
struction like the presumption against preemption). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 882 
tations may go unreviewed, and that any reviewing court will accord the 
agency’s view some level of deference, simply underscores the need for 
agencies to apply the Rice presumption in the first instance.   
President Clinton’s Executive Order on federalism66 appears to require 
agencies to apply a similar presumption when evaluating the preemptive ef-
fect of federal statutes.  The Order provides: 
Agencies shall construe . . . a Federal statute to preempt State law only where 
the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other 
clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or where 
the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority 
under the Federal statute.67 
Given the language of the Order, it is not clear that federal agencies have 
the authority to follow the federal courts in limiting the presumption against 
preemption to fields of traditional state authority.68  The Order, after all, 
seems to require “clear evidence” of preemptive intent in all cases.69  This 
may reflect an implicit acknowledgement that “the category of traditional 
arenas of state regulation is so subject to manipulation that almost any state 
law or regulation could be characterized as falling or not falling within a 
traditional arena.”70 
On the other hand, the Order does leave agencies free to find conflict 
preemption; it does not by its terms reinforce its requirement of a clear tex-
tual statement for express preemption with a requirement that the existence 
of a significant practical conflict be equally clear.  This highlights a basic 
weakness of the Rice presumption as a constraint on federal preemption: the 
presumption is generally stated as a lens to employ in construing a statutory 
text, but many preemption debates lack an explicit textual provision to con-
strue.  Instead, analysis by both agencies and courts focuses on issues of 
functional conflict.71  To be truly effective, the Rice approach to textual 
 
66  See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
67  Id. at 43,257. 
68  Compare United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 107–08 (2000) (suggesting that the Rice presump-
tion applies only in areas of traditional state regulation), with Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 
(1996) (plurality opinion) (stating that the presumption applies “in all pre-emption cases”).     
69  At least some agencies, however, seem to have limited the presumption’s scope anyway.  See, 
e.g., Cleveland, Ohio Requirements for Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 66 Fed. Reg. 29,867, 
29,870 (June 1, 2001) (gutting the effect of the Order through an expansive interpretation of Locke). 
70  Dana, supra note 21, at 515; see also id. at 515–16 (demonstrating how regulation of greenhouse 
gases can plausibly be characterized as either a federal or a state issue); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985) (rejecting the category of “traditional state functions” as hope-
lessly indeterminate and therefore unworkable).  As Professor Dana points out, limiting the Rice pre-
sumption to areas of traditional state concern—even if we could identify those areas in a principled and 
consistent way—is also “inconsistent with [a] conception of the states as central to changing paradigms 
and practices in governance.”  Dana, supra note 21, at 517. 
71  See Dana, supra note 21, at 509–11. 
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construction must be paired with an analogous “thumb on the scale” in 
evaluating the degree of conflict required for preemption. 
In any event, there is little evidence that agencies have paid much at-
tention to the Federalism Order.  As Nina Mendelson points out, the Order 
also requires federal agencies to analyze the impact of their decisions on 
federalism values, but compliance with the formal requirement is rare, and 
the quality of the analysis highly perfunctory.72  She concludes that “agency 
rulemaking staff is not especially sensitive to the sorts of concerns that have 
motivated federalism advocates.”73  It might be possible to put teeth in the 
Federalism Order, and its invocation of the Rice presumption, through the 
oversight functions of congressional committees or centralized executive 
review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).74  A more aggres-
sive option would be to amend the Order to make noncompliance an inde-
pendent ground for judicial evaluation of the agency action in question.75  
As I suggest in the next Section, however, the most promising route would 
be to make compliance a variable in calibrating the degree of deference that 
agency interpretations receive on judicial review.76  To the extent that fed-
eral agencies have strong incentives to supplant state regulations, review by 
the Article III Judiciary is likely to be the more promising means of limiting 
agency preemption.77  
B. Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations 
The more difficult questions arise when courts must review an 
agency’s interpretation of a federal statute’s preemptive effect.  Here, the 
presumption against preemption may conflict with the Chevron rule, which 
requires courts to defer to agency interpretations of the statute the agency 
 
72  Mendelson, Chevron, supra note 49, at 782–86. 
73  Id. at 785. 
74  See generally Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (providing for central-
ized OMB review of agency action).  
75  The current version of the Order disclaims any right of private enforcement.  See Exec. Order No. 
13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,259 (Aug. 4, 1999) (“This order is intended only to improve the internal 
management of the executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any per-
son.”).   
76  See infra text accompanying note 124.  
77  See Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 
70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1441 (1984) (“The agency is an interested party, not an independent arbiter.  This 
conflict of interest . . . exacerbates the federal bias inherent in the agency’s non-representative charac-
ter.”).  The federal courts, of course, are not wholly uninterested parties either; their paychecks come 
from the federal government, and they are likely to prefer dealing with federal law to state law.  See Ste-
ven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. 
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 808 (1995); Cross, supra note 33, at 1315–20 (1999).  But there is no 
truly neutral tribunal available, and the courts are likely to be far preferable to federal agencies in this 
regard.  The tendency of the federal courts to favor federal law can be disciplined somewhat, moreover, 
by interpretive presumptions. 
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administers if (1) the statute is ambiguous and (2) the agency’s interpreta-
tion is reasonable.78  Again, not all scenarios raise equal difficulties.  Some-
times the agency will find state law not preempted so that Rice and Chevron 
will press in the same direction.79  If anything, the Rice anti-preemption 
canon ought to add an additional presumption that a nonpreemptive agency 
interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute at step two of the 
Chevron analysis. 
We can set aside a second not-so-difficult case by distinguishing be-
tween agency interpretations of what the underlying statute actually does or 
requires and interpretations of the statute’s effects on state law.  In Smiley 
v. Citibank,80 the Court construed section 30 of the National Bank Act, 
which permits national banks to charge their loan customers “interest at the 
rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is located.”81  The 
Court had previously held that this provision allows a national bank head-
quartered in, say, South Dakota to charge its credit card customers in other 
states the interest rate permitted by South Dakota, regardless of the rules in 
the customers’ own states.82  In effect, the Bank Act preempted the ability 
of the customers’ home states to regulate the interest paid by their citizens 
to out-of-state banks.  The question in Smiley was whether late payment 
fees on credit card debts counted as “interest” under the statute.  The Court 
unanimously deferred to the conclusion of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(who is charged with regulating national banks) on this question, rejecting 
the argument that the preemptive effect of section 30 foreclosed Chevron 
deference.83  Justice Scalia wrote for the Court: 
This argument confuses the question of the substantive (as opposed to pre-
emptive) meaning of a statute with the question of whether a statute is pre-
emptive.  We may assume (without deciding) that the latter question must al-
ways be decided de novo by the courts.  That is not the question at issue here; 
there is no doubt that [the Act] pre-empts state law.84 
Smiley thus makes clear that agency interpretations of what a statute means, 
does, or requires are not excluded from Chevron simply because those in-
terpretations may have preemptive implications.  As the D.C. Circuit had 
 
78  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
79  See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495–96 (1996) (giving “substantial weight” to 
the FDA’s construction of the Medical Devices Amendments not to preempt the Lohrs’ claims); Hills-
borough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 714–15 (1985) (holding that the FDA’s state-
ment of its intent not to preempt state law in the relevant regulation was “dispositive . . . unless either 
the agency’s position is inconsistent with clearly expressed congressional intent . . . or subsequent de-
velopments reveal a change in that position” (citation omitted)). 
80  517 U.S. 735 (1996). 
81  12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000); Smiley, 517 U.S. at 787. 
82  See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 307–19 
(1978). 
83  Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739–40. 
84  Id. at 744. 
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earlier observed, “with the exception of negative exercises of federal au-
thority, all agency legal interpretations have some preemptive effect; no 
state law in direct contradiction will survive.  Petitioner’s special nondefer-
ence principle would therefore have to be applied almost universally, over-
turning Chevron.”85  Deference becomes problematic only when the agency 
is addressing the preemption question itself by, for example, construing a 
preemption clause in the federal statute or considering whether a given state 
statute conflicts with a federal statute’s underlying purpose. 
This problematic set, of course, contains a fairly significant universe of 
cases.  Where the agency does decide the preemption question itself and, in 
fact, interprets its statute to preempt state law, Rice and Chevron are in con-
flict.  Judge Kravitch has put the conflict this way: 
[T]o say that a court should defer to an agency’s determination that state law is 
preempted is seemingly paradoxical: the agency would command deference 
under Chevron only if the federal statute were ambiguous; but if the federal 
statute were ambiguous, then Congress’s intent to preempt seemingly would 
not be “clear and manifest.”86 
This view has not always carried the day, however.  Some lower courts 
have deferred under Chevron to agency conclusions that the statutes they 
administer preempt state law.87  The Supreme Court has not definitively re-
solved the issue; Smiley left open the question of how courts should resolve 
an outright conflict between the centralizing force of deference to an 
agency’s preemptive interpretation of a federal statute and the decentraliz-
ing thrust of the presumption against preemption.88  In the most recent case 
 
85  Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 28 F.3d 1281, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
86  Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1996) (Kravitch, J.); see also McGreal, supra note 9, 
at 843 (outlining the conflict between Rice and Chevron).  Judge Calabresi recently reached a similar 
conclusion, observing that “whatever deference would be owed to an agency’s view in contexts where a 
presumption against federal preemption does apply, an agency cannot supply, on Congress’s behalf, the 
clear legislative statement of intent required to overcome the presumption against preemption.”  Desiano 
v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 97–98 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d by an equally divided court, 128 
S. Ct. 1168 (2008). 
87  See, e.g., Freeman v. Burlington Broadcasters, Inc., 204 F.3d 311, 322 (2d Cir. 2000).  But cf. 
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 804–05 (5th Cir. 2000) (treating the choice as one 
between de novo review of the agency’s preemption ruling and Chevron deference and noting that this 
choice was an unresolved question). 
88  See Mass. Ass’n of Health Maint. Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 1999).  As Judge Se-
lya pointed out in Ruthardt, “[t]he intervening decision in Medtronic [v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)] 
only complicates matters.”  Ruthardt, 194 F.3d at 182.  Five justices in Medtronic did give some sort of 
deference to the agency’s determination on the preemption question, see 518 U.S. at 494–96 (giving 
“substantial weight” to the agency’s view on the preemption question); id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring 
in part and in the judgment) (suggesting that the agency “possesses a degree of leeway” in resolving pre-
emption issues), but Justice O’Connor’s dissent read them as not applying Chevron.  See id. at 511 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  More importantly, Chevron and Rice pressed 
in the same direction in that case, as the agency had interpreted the statute not to preempt state law.  
Medtronic thus had no occasion to address the question that arises when the two rules of construction 
cut in different directions. 
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that might have addressed the issue, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., the 
Court avoided the question by basing its holding that state law was pre-
empted on its own independent reading of the underlying statute.89 
My own view is that, in this case of direct conflict between Rice and 
Chevron, Rice’s presumption against preemption should prevail.90  Chevron 
typically is justified on three different grounds.  First, the Court has sug-
gested that Congress, by writing an ambiguous statute, should be held to 
have delegated the policy choices within the zone of statutory ambiguity to 
the administering agency.91  Second, policy choices resulting from ambigu-
ity should be made by the decisionmaker with the greater claim to democ-
ratic legitimacy, which favors executive agencies—accountable to voters 
through the President—over courts.92  Third, some have justified Chevron 
on the ground “that agencies have greater policy expertise than courts.”93  
The case against allowing Chevron to trump Rice becomes clear when we 
consider these justifications in the special context of preemption. 
Delegation, as I have suggested, is problematic from the perspective of 
federalism because it circumvents the political and procedural safeguards 
that ordinarily protect state autonomy.  Chevron exacerbates the problem by 
presuming delegations where there is little evidence of actual congressional 
intent to support them,94 and by minimizing the extent to which the statutory 
                                                                                                                           
The Court likewise had no occasion to consider this question in Geier.  Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion did “place some weight” upon the agency interpretation in that case, see Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000), but the agency was interpreting the preemptive effect of its own 
regulations—not that of the underlying statute itself.  Geier thus raised the issue of the preemptive effect 
of agency action per se, not the weight to be accorded an agency interpretation of a congressional en-
actment. 
89  127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007). 
90  The most reliable proponent of this view on the current Court is Justice Stevens—may he live 
long and prosper.  See, e.g., Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1584 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No case from this 
Court has ever applied such a deferential standard [as Chevron] to an agency decision that could so eas-
ily disrupt the federal-state balance. . . . [W]hen an agency purports to decide the scope of federal pre-
emption, a healthy respect for state sovereignty calls for something less than Chevron deference.”). 
91  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 197–98 (2006) (arguing that the delegation rationale 
has won out). 
92  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provi-
sion, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is 
a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.  In such a case, federal 
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who 
do.”).  See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Admin-
istrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 466–67 (1989) (discussing the delegation and democratic ac-
countability justifications for Chevron). 
93  Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2135 
(2002) (noting this as “[t]he leading alternative theory for Chevron” but ultimately finding it unsatisfac-
tory). 
94  See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 
370 (1986) (stating that “legislative intent to delegate the law-interpreting function” is “a kind of legal 
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text can constrain the exercise of delegated power.95  The vesting of legisla-
tive power in Congress under Article I ought to limit delegations, but that 
norm is chronically underenforced.96  It seems odd in general to respond to 
that problem of underenforcement by adding an interpretive rule—
Chevron—that extends the effect of delegations even further.  That is par-
ticularly true when Chevron undermines attempts to protect another under-
enforced constitutional norm—state autonomy—through the Rice 
presumption against preemption.97 
The second justification for Chevron—that agencies are more politi-
cally accountable than courts—may make sense when those are the only 
two institutions in the picture.  But the context of preemption adds a third 
decisionmaker: the state governmental institution responsible for the rule 
that is being preempted.  The state institution is likely to be both closer to 
the people and, in the case of state legislatures (as well as some state courts 
and executive officials), directly accountable to them.98  In these circum-
stances, the democratic legitimacy justification for deferring to the federal 
agency simply does not apply.99  Nor should we forget that state institutions 
have their own basis of constitutional legitimacy as separate sovereigns in 
the federal system.100 
                                                                                                                           
fiction”); Elhauge, supra note 93, at 2132 (“[I]t seems dubious to conclude that the enactment of a vague 
statute itself indicates a congressional intent to give agencies discretion over its interpretation.”). 
95  See Farina, supra note 92, at 498 (suggesting that judicial deference to an agency interpretation of 
a statute limits Congress’s ability to delegate narrowly). 
96  See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“[W]e have ‘almost 
never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that 
can be left to those executing or applying the law.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
97  See generally Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 45, at 1552–53 (arguing that interpre-
tive presumptions are a good way to protect underenforced constitutional norms). 
98  See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1990) (observing that federalism “assures a 
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society” 
and “increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes”); Deborah Jones Merritt, 
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–
10 (1988). 
99  It is true that state institutions are democratically accountable only to the people of the state, and 
not to the nation as a whole, and that in some cases such state institutions will have incentives to favor 
local interests at the expense of national ones.  Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
326–30 (1819) (holding that Maryland could not tax the Bank of the United States, in part because the 
Maryland legislature did not account for the national interests embodied by the Bank).  This observation 
might suggest a narrower scope for the Rice presumption in cases where a holding of nonpreemption 
would significantly disadvantage out-of-state interests vis-à-vis in-state interests.  But if the state law in 
question really is discriminatory in this way, then it likely is unconstitutional under the dormant com-
merce clause without recourse to statutory preemption analysis.  See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (“If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually 
per se invalid.”).  In any event, many preemption cases will involve regulatory burdens falling on in-
staters and out-of-staters alike.   
100  See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008) (emphasizing that “States are in-
dependent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws”); New York v. United 
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Finally, there is the question of agency expertise.101  As an initial mat-
ter, it is considerably harder to tie the expertise rationale to constitutional 
values than it is to ground arguments from delegation (which rely on Con-
gress’s primary lawmaking authority) or democratic accountability (which 
claim constitutional legitimacy for the agency itself).  American law has 
never been quite so deferential to technocratic expertise as, say, European 
legal culture.102  It is easy to cite instances, moreover, in which agencies ap-
pear to act politically rather than as experts, even in the teeth of their own 
experts’ advice.103  This expertise question, moreover, is frequently ad-
dressed in terms of the agency’s expertise concerning the particular ques-
tion of regulatory policy under the relevant statute: Is the federal agency or 
the state legislature (or even worse, fifty state legislatures) more competent 
to formulate efficient product safety rules?104   
This approach, however, elides a second expertise question: Which in-
stitution (the federal agency or the reviewing court) is more expert at inter-
preting a statute’s preemptive effect and, more broadly, at bringing 
constitutional concerns about federalism to bear on that question?  Federal 
agencies have only limited expertise with regard to that issue.105  Indeed, the 
sporadic and perfunctory compliance of federal administrators with the 
Federalism Executive Order, which requires explicit analysis of federalism 
concerns, consultation with state officials, and a narrow approach to pre-
emption, suggests that federal agencies have little desire or competence in 
addressing issues of state-federal balance.106  
                                                                                                                           
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–69 (1992) (grounding the anti-commandeering doctrine in the need to make 
sure that state governmental officials remain accountable to their own citizens). 
101  Although expertise is sometimes cited as a basis for Chevron deference, see, e.g., Kaganovich v. 
Gonzales, 470 F.3d. 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2006), it is more frequently associated with lesser forms of defer-
ence, see, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1156–58 (2008); Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833, 855 (2001) (“Under Skidmore, . . . it does not matter whether Congress has delegated authority 
to an agency to administer the statute as long as the agency has relevant expertise.”).   
102  See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Marbury in the Modern Era: Comparative Constitutionalism in a New 
Key, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2677, 2699 (2003) (“The norms of Europe are bureaucratic, not democratic.”); 
Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1995–96 (2004) (noting 
the “faith in an expert, neutral bureaucratic rationality” in European political thought); Eric Stein, Inter-
national Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 516 (2001) (“The 
European Community was conceived as an essentially technocratic organization, and has moved gradu-
ally toward greater democracy.”). 
103  See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, EPA Tightens U.S. Smog Standards But Agency Ignored Advisers’ 
Guidance, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2008, at A1. 
104  See, e.g., Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 13, at 485–86. 
105  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 
755–56 (2008); see also, e.g., Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir. 
1991) (refusing to defer to an agency conclusion that a federal statute preempted state law on the ground 
that “a preemption determination involves matters of law—an area more within the expertise of the 
courts than within the expertise of the [agency]”).  
106  See Mendelson, Chevron, supra note 49, at 782–86. 
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To be sure, the agency has a greater familiarity with “its” statute than 
does a generalist court, but I have already said that courts should defer to an 
agency’s determination of what its statute actually does.  The further ques-
tion of whether the federal statute preempts state law, however, is not a pol-
icy judgment within the agency’s expertise.  That question, rather, is not 
only one of statutory interpretation but, in a broader sense, one of allocating 
power between the federal and state governments.  On this issue, the agency 
has strong incentives to overread its own authority and little reason to be 
sensitive to the broader constitutional question.  As Thomas Merrill ob-
serves, agencies are likely to have “tunnel vision”; they “know a great deal 
about one federal regulatory scheme, . . . . [b]ut they are unlikely to have 
much knowledge—or even care—about larger questions concerning the di-
vision of authority between the federal government and the states.”107  And 
allowing agencies to define the scope of their own authority runs headlong 
into the venerable constitutional principle that “foxes should not guard hen-
houses.”108 
The presence of the states as a third alternative decisionmaker, more-
over, complicates the expertise picture much as it does the issue of democ-
ratic accountability.  Federal regulators may enjoy expertise advantages on 
many matters, but there are likely to be some questions—such as how to 
adapt general directives to local conditions—on which state regulators have 
an edge.  Likewise, expertise is not always a static quality.  To the extent 
that state regulators are confident that they can remain active in a field—
that is, that they are not about to be preempted—they will have incentives 
to invest in developing expertise in the area.109  Indeed, Jacob Gersen has 
suggested that Congress may prefer to permit both federal and state regula-
tors to exercise jurisdiction in the same field in order to spur regulatory 
competition that, in turn, might maximize regulatory expertise.110  In any 
event, expertise hardly makes a clear-cut case for Chevron deference to fed-
eral regulators in the preemption context. 
If Chevron deference is inappropriate, then how should courts review 
agency interpretations of the preemptive scope of the statutes they adminis-
ter?  Interestingly, the three other contributions to this Symposium that ad-
dress that question display quite distinct attitudes—Professor Merrill seems 
quite skeptical of agencies;111 Professor Sharkey positively adores them;112 
 
107  Merrill, supra note 105, at 755. 
108  See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 446 
(1989). 
109  Cf. Gersen, supra note 17, at 213 (arguing that expertise is often a function of different adminis-
trators’ incentives to invest in developing it). 
110  See id. at 235–36. 
111  See Merrill, supra note 105, at 759 (concluding that “it would disserve the cause of constitu-
tional government” to “transfer broad authority from courts to agencies to decide when to displace state 
law”).  
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and Professor Mendelson is somewhere in the middle113—but all converge 
in their prescriptions on the notion of Skidmore deference.114  Under Skid-
more, “[t]he weight of [an agency’s] judgment in a particular case will de-
pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to con-
trol.”115 
I suspect that my three copanelists have converged on Skidmore not 
because that standard brilliantly harmonizes the concerns of each, but rather 
because it is a standard that can mean different things to different people.  
Or even to the same people: As Kristin Hickman and Matthew Krueger 
have pointed out,116 the Supreme Court itself has offered two quite different 
versions of Skidmore in its decisions in Christensen v. Harris County117 and 
United States v. Mead Corp.118  Professors Hickman and Krueger read 
Christensen as employing an “independent judgment” model that amounts 
to “no deference at all.”119  Mead, on the other hand, represents a model of 
“deference varying along a sliding scale,” depending on a variety of contex-
tual factors having to do with the agency’s decision.120  One need not accept 
the specific definitions or boundaries of these categories to take the more 
basic point that Skidmore is something of a juridical chameleon.  Advocat-
ing Skidmore as a standard for considering executive preemption thus 
                                                                                                                           
112  See Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 13, at 844 (presenting a model of “complementary 
agency-court action in combating fraud” though “reserving a role for state law tort claims to handle en-
forcement and remedial responsibilities”). 
113  Professor Mendelson’s contribution to the current Symposium comes down fairly firmly in favor 
of limiting agency preemption.  See generally Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Pre-
emption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 698–99 (2008) [hereinafter Mendelson, Presumption].  Her prior en-
try in the field, while reaching similar conclusions, emphasized the presence of arguments on both sides 
of the question.  See, e.g., Mendelson, Chevron, supra note 49, at 794–98 (arguing that agency self-
interest weighs against Chevron deference on preemption questions, but only “weakly”). 
114  See Mendelson, Chevron, supra note 49, at 797–98 (arguing that the application of Skidmore 
deference to agency interpretation of preemption could present fewer problems than does Chevron def-
erence); Merrill, supra note 105, at 774–76; Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 13, at 
491–98.  Professor Merrill’s embrace of Skidmore is more equivocal than Sharkey’s or Mendelson’s.  He 
states:  
If forced to choose between the three established standards of review (Chevron, Skidmore, de 
novo), I would urge adoption of the Skidmore standard for preemption cases.  For several reasons, 
however, I think the best course of action is to eschew any of the established three standards and 
instead adopt an approach to agency views about preemption that is sui generis to preemption 
cases. 
Merrill, supra note 105, at 775 (footnote omitted).  
115  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
116  See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1252–59 (2007). 
117  529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
118  533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
119  Hickman & Krueger, supra note 116, at 1252–53. 
120  Id. at 1255–56. 
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merely begins a conversation about how preemptive agency interpretations 
should be evaluated. 
Under Skidmore’s traditional formula, a court will defer to an agency’s 
interpretation if that interpretation is persuasive, for all the reasons that such 
interpretations typically might be persuasive: expertise, procedural thor-
oughness, consistency, etc.  This posture is so elemental as to seem inevita-
ble.  In practice, however, Skidmore deference represents a powerful thumb 
on the scale in favor of agency interpretations.  After analyzing 106 applica-
tions of Skidmore by the federal courts of appeal between 2001 and 2006, 
Professors Hickman and Krueger found that “Skidmore review is highly 
deferential—less so than Chevron, but still weighted heavily in favor of 
government agencies over their challengers.”121  What any version of Skid-
more appears to rule out, moreover, is any sort of presumption against the 
agency’s interpretation, such as that which the Rice presumption against 
preemption would impose if the agency’s interpretation displaced state law.  
For that reason, I am unwilling to jump on the Skidmore bandwagon; my 
own view is that the Rice presumption is sufficiently important and suffi-
ciently tied to constitutional values that it should override even agency in-
terpretations that might otherwise be persuasive.122 
In principle, however, it is not impossible to imagine giving some de-
gree of weight to the fact that a preemptive interpretation comes from an 
expert agency while also holding that such interpretations bear a heightened 
burden of proof for federalism reasons.  Admonishing courts to assess the 
relative weights of competing “thumbs on the scale” does not seem all that 
promising, but there may be other ways to resolve these contradictory inter-
pretive imperatives.  One way to improve on the Skidmore approach would 
be to specify a list of factors favoring deference to the agency that is more 
particular to the preemption context.123  A preemption-specific version of 
Skidmore might prescribe deference to the agency’s interpretation of federal 
law if:  
• the agency itself considered the Rice presumption in the first instance, 
as required by Executive Order 13,132;124 
• the agency’s analysis includes a “federalism impact statement,” also 
required by the Federalism Order, that is nonperfunctory;125 
 
121  Id. at 1280–81. 
122  As a practical matter, it seems to me that Professors Merrill’s and Mendelson’s embrace of 
Skidmore fails to do justice to their persuasive identification of reasons not to trust federal agencies in 
preemption cases.  As Mendelson points out, “judges regularly defer to agency interpretations under 
Skidmore.”  Mendelson, Chevron, supra note 49, at 798.  If we really wish to limit agency preemption, 
stronger medicine is indicated. 
123  Cf. Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 779 (2007) (pro-
posing more specific factors to guide Skidmore deference in the treaty interpretation context).  
124  Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 4, 1999).  
125  See id. at 43,258 (section 6(c)(2)); see also id. at 43,258 (section 8(a)) (requiring that “any draft 
final regulation that has federalism implications” shall include, on submission to the Office of Manage-
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• the preemption determination turns on the existence of policy conflicts, 
which the agency may have special expertise in identifying, rather than 
on pure statutory construction; 
• state officials had prior notice that the agency was considering a pre-
emption finding, and those officials participated in the agency’s pre-
emption determination, by notice and comment or otherwise;126 
• the agency’s preemption finding includes a limiting principle preserv-
ing meaningful areas of state regulatory authority; and/or 
• the agency in question has a moderate history—that is, it sometimes 
finds against preemption rather than always expanding its own author-
ity at the expense of the states.  
These suggested criteria would help ensure compliance with existing law 
within the executive branch and help replicate, within the agency process, at 
least some aspects of the political and procedural safeguards of federalism 
that characterize legislative action.  Moreover, articulating a more specific 
list of factors under Skidmore should enhance the Supreme Court’s ability 
to control the lower courts’ approach to deference.   
The turn from Chevron to Skidmore (or Skidmore-like) deference 
opens up an additional and intriguing possibility.  Chevron proceeded on 
the theory that Congress had delegated interpretive authority to a particular 
actor—the federal agency.  Skidmore, by contrast, proceeds on the very dif-
ferent (and very basic) principle that certain qualities of an interpretation 
and its maker make it more or less persuasive.127  The key difference is that 
those qualities emphasized by Skidmore are not unique to the federal 
agency.  This is particularly true in agency preemption cases, which typi-
cally measure the decision of one governmental actor (the federal agency) 
against another (the state legislature, state administrative agency, or state 
court) that formulated the rule to be preempted.  In many cases, the state ac-
tion may display the same sorts of decisional qualities—thorough consid-
eration, consistency with past practice, thoughtful reasoning, or even policy 
expertise—that counsel deference under Skidmore.  Skidmore deference, in 
other words, is not in principle confined to federal governmental entities.  A 
court applying Skidmore could well conclude that a state agency’s interpre-
tation of the underlying federal statute as not preempting the state law pos-
sessed greater indicia of reliability than did a contrary decision by a federal 
agency, with the result that the court should defer to the state decision-
maker. 
                                                                                                                           
ment and Budget, a certification of compliance with the Order’s requirement to consider federalism val-
ues). 
126  See id. at 43,257–58 (section 6).  Some lower courts have refused to defer to agency interpreta-
tions finding statutory preemption when these consultation requirements have not been met.  See, e.g., 
Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 & n.3 (D. Neb. 2006). 
127  See, e.g., Hickman & Krueger, supra note 116, at 1249 (noting that Chevron deference rests on a 
“presumption that Congress chose an agency rather than the courts to be the primary interpreter of a 
given statutory scheme,” while Skidmore deference “merely reflects a policy of judicial prudence”). 
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This may feel like an unnatural posture for federal courts to adopt, but 
requiring federal courts to defer to interpretations by state entities is hardly 
unheard of.  Federal courts routinely defer to state court interpretations of 
state law,128 and some statutory schemes even require deference to state in-
terpretations of federal law.129  Preemption cases often require the inter-
preter to resolve ambiguities in both federal and state law; after all, one 
must construe state law to determine whether it conflicts with federal pol-
icy.130  In this situation, of course, neither federal nor state interpreters have 
a categorical claim to interpretive supremacy.   
To the extent that preemption cases also involve technical expertise in 
a general regulatory field, such as environmental protection, both state and 
federal agencies may have legitimate claims to deference.131  It may be true 
that the quality of expertise, and perhaps of deliberation, is generally greater 
at the federal level.  But that is an empirical question that ought not be de-
cided by mere assumption.  As I suggest above, federal agencies do not al-
ways act deliberately or enjoy superior expertise,132 and state agencies may 
bring impressive competence to the table in particular areas.  Moreover, the 
comparative competence of state and federal actors need not be decided 
across the board for all possible institutional permutations and subject areas.  
The virtuous side of Skidmore’s ambiguity, after all, is that it permits the 
level of deference to be adjusted to the circumstances of particular situa-
tions.133 
 
128  See, e.g., King v. United Order of Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 158 (1948) (“[W]hen 
the issue confronting a federal court has previously been decided by the highest court in the appropriate 
state[,] the Erie R. Co. case decided that decisions and opinions of that court are binding on federal 
courts.”); Cent. Union Tel. Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925) (stating that, even where a 
federal right turns upon a state court’s construction of state law, the construction “declared by the state 
court . . . should bind [the U.S. Supreme Court] unless so unfair or unreasonable in its application to 
those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it”). 
129  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (holding that a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief 
to a person in state custody only if the state court’s prior adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”); Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410–11 (2000) (construing § 2254(d) to require some degree of deference to state 
court interpretations of federal law involving mixed questions of law and fact). 
130  See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 213–14 (1983) (construing a state statute restricting building of nuclear plants to determine whether 
it fell within the field preempted by federal law). 
131  Cf. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 116, at 1263 (observing that “Skidmore’s attention to 
agency expertise might suggest that it should apply to state agencies,” but recognizing that “the Court 
has never suggested that Skidmore extends that far”).  Professors Hickman and Krueger focus on defer-
ence to state agency interpretations of state law only, and that may explain the paucity of Supreme Court 
authority.  After all, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to resolve questions of state law is considerably 
narrower than that of the lower federal courts.  For a federal court of appeals decision according Skid-
more deference to a state agency’s construction of state law, see, for example, Ace Electrical Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 414 F.3d 896, 903 (8th Cir. 2005). 
132  See supra text accompanying note 103. 
133  Cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (suggesting that even Chevron deference 
should be tailored case by case). 
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The broader point is that federalism analysis all too often considers 
federal law and federal decisions in a vacuum, without any reference to the 
quality of state decisionmaking.134  Nothing in the Supremacy Clause re-
quires this sort of willful blindness.  Federal agencies often are not the only 
institutional actors with expertise in preemption cases, and a standard that 
took this into account would be salutary.  Even this latitudinarian version of 
Skidmore, however, must be tempered with some mechanism—like the Rice 
presumption—for giving independent weight to the constitutional values 
disfavoring broad preemption of state law.135 
III. AGENCY ACTIONS WITH INDEPENDENT PREEMPTIVE EFFECT 
An even more difficult set of problems arises when federal administra-
tive agencies preempt state law through their own independent actions 
rather than through their interpretations of the statutes they administer.  
Sometimes Congress explicitly delegates the authority to preempt state 
law.136  Other times, agencies have interpreted broad statutory statements of 
their regulatory authority as authorizing agency preemption of state law.  
 
134  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (ignoring the effects of the California regula-
tory regime in assessing the federal government’s interests in regulating medical marijuana); see also 
Young, Blowing Smoke, supra note 34, at 33–37 (criticizing the Court’s approach). 
135  Professor Dana’s contribution to this Symposium suggests a different means of calibrating judi-
cial application of the presumption against preemption.  His approach would weigh the clarity of Con-
gress’s preemptive intent against the “weight of democratic support for nonfederal alternatives” at the 
state level.  Dana, supra note 21, at 527.  This approach is appealing for its recognition that state gov-
ernments are themselves a font of democratic legitimacy.  See id. at 518–22.  I am troubled, however, by 
Dana’s suggestion that courts should give more weight to the policies adopted by large or multiple 
states, as opposed to the policies of small or singular states.  See id. at 522–23 (discussing Atkins v. Vir-
ginia and Roper v. Simmons as examples of Supreme Court precedents informed by the number of states 
rejecting the practices at issue in those cases).  Such an approach obviously runs counter to the tradi-
tional notion that states are sovereign equals—a notion reflected, for example, in the “equal footing” 
doctrine.  See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. 
City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1883) (“Equality of constitutional right and power is the condition 
of all the states of the Union, old and new.”). 
To be sure, valid federal legislation does sometimes treat different states differently, and indeed such 
legislation sometimes exempts certain states from preemption but not others.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7543(b)(1) (allowing California a special exemption to set more stringent vehicle emissions standards 
than would otherwise be allowed under the federal Clean Air Act).  But such disparities illustrate that 
significant differences in majoritarian heft among state policies will often be reflected in the terms of 
legislation; building such differences into the judicial test for preemption as well seems like double-
counting.  Moreover, such an approach would likely exacerbate the phenomenon of “horizontal aggran-
dizement,” whereby groups of powerful states use the federal government as an instrument to impose 
their preferences on other states.  See Baker & Young, supra note 43, at 117–28.  My own view is that 
preemption doctrine should be attuned to protecting Justice Brandeis’s “single courageous state,” New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), as well as large and popu-
lous state coalitions. 
136  See Foote, supra note 77, at 1429 (“[In many federal health and safety statutes,] Congress dele-
gated to federal administrative agencies the responsibility for deciding whether to preempt . . . state laws 
or to exempt them from preemption under the governing federal statute.”). 
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The Communications Act, for instance, confers upon the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) broad authority to determine what the “public 
convenience, interest, or necessity requires” in the communications field, 
including the authority to “[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe 
such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be neces-
sary to carry out [the communications laws in Title 47 of the U.S. Code].”137  
The FCC has read this broad grant of authority—which itself says nothing 
about preemption—as conferring general authority on the agency to pre-
empt state law whenever the agency feels that federally imposed uniformity 
will best further the policy of the Communications Act.138  Under this au-
thority, the FCC has issued orders that purport to preempt state law of their 
own force, rather than as an interpretation of a congressional directive.139 
The Supreme Court recently sidestepped the issue of an agency’s inde-
pendent preemptive authority in Watters.  In that case, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) asserted that one of its regulations pre-
empted state law, but the majority held that the question of the OCC’s au-
thority to enact such a regulation was “beside the point, for under our 
interpretation of the statute, . . . [the regulation] merely clarifies and con-
firms what the [underlying statute] already conveys.”140  As Professor Men-
delson’s contribution to this Symposium notes, however, “[f]ederal 
agencies are increasingly taking aim at state law, even though state law is 
not expressly targeted by the statutes the agencies administer.”141  The prob-
lem is thus likely to return to the Court before long. 
This sort of preemption is extremely problematic for reasons that 
should be obvious.  There is, for instance, the small matter of the constitu-
tional text.  Article VI confers supremacy over state law only on “[t]his 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof”142—not on administrative actions taken pursuant to proce-
dures that do not appear in the founding document.143  Although an agency’s 
interpretive power to say when a federal statute preempts state law is trou-
bling, at least its decision to preempt in that scenario is grounded in a con-
 
137  47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2000); see also id. § 154(i) (“The Commission may perform any and all acts, 
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be neces-
sary in the execution of its functions.”). 
138  See, e.g., Cable Television Report and Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 470, 480 (1974). 
139  See, e.g., Technical and Operational Requirements of Part 76 Cable Television, 50 Fed. Reg. 
52,462, 52,464–65 (Dec. 24, 1985) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76 (1986)) (preempting local regulation of 
technical signal quality standards for cable television). 
140  Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007). 
141  Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 113, at 695. 
142  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The same provision also recognizes treaties as supreme federal law.  
See id. 
143  See generally Clark, supra note 44, at 1330 (emphasizing that the text of the Supremacy Clause 
limits the forms of federal law that can trump state law). 
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gressional enactment, and the agency’s interpretation of that enactment 
must at least be reasonable under Chevron’s step two.   
It is probably too late in the day to insist that federal agency action 
cannot create supreme federal law.144  But that concession simply strength-
ens the need to look closely at the way that preemptive actions by agencies 
fit into the structure of contemporary federalism.  When the agency has in-
dependent preemptive authority, the preemption decision is made outside 
the political and procedural constraints in which modern federalism doc-
trine places its primary hope.  Moreover, as I suggest above, we can expect 
agencies to have strong incentives to maximize their own power by sup-
planting state autonomy more often than not.145 
The Supreme Court has nonetheless upheld these independent exer-
cises of preemptive power, stating that “a federal agency acting within the 
scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regula-
tion.”146  Statements like this could be read to permit preemption by agen-
cies on their own initiative only where Congress has explicitly delegated 
preemptive authority.  Yet the Court has recognized a far broader power to 
preempt state law wherever the subject matter of the agency’s action (con-
sidered apart from its impact on state law) is within the scope of the 
agency’s delegated power.147  In other words, if the Communications Act 
authorizes the FCC to regulate cable television, then it also presumptively 
authorizes a corollary preemptive power.  Agency action will thus be held 
to preempt state law if (1) the agency intended it to do so, and (2) the 
agency’s preemptive action is within the scope of its delegated authority.148  
Given the broad scope of delegations, such as that in the Communications 
Act, the external constraints on agency preemptive action appear to be 
minimal indeed. 
The preemptive authority of administrative agencies could be limited 
in a number of ways, some of which would represent a more substantial 
shift away from present law than others.  One obvious limitation would be 
to hold that Congress may not delegate the authority to preempt state law.  
This would certainly be consistent with Garcia’s principle that, within the 
broad range of concurrent jurisdiction shared by the federal government and 
the states, the basic decisions about the allocation of authority are to be 
 
144  The most ardent anti-preemption member of the current Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, did not 
dispute in Watters that Congress may delegate preemptive power; instead, he disputed “whether Con-
gress has delegated to the Comptroller of the Currency the authority to preempt the laws of a sovereign 
State . . . , and if so, whether that authority was properly exercised here.”  Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1582 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
145  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
146  La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986). 
147  See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1988) (citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
476 U.S. at 368–69). 
148  See id. at 64–66; Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984); Fid. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982). 
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made by Congress.149  Such a limitation, however, would be easier to state 
in theory than to implement in practice.  Every agency action, after all, po-
tentially preempts state law in the sense that a state law in direct conflict 
with that action will not stand under the Supremacy Clause.  A hard and fast 
rule barring all preemptive agency action would thus sweep too broadly. 
A more limited alternative would bar agency preemption that goes be-
yond the direct supremacy effect of the agency’s substantive actions.150  For 
example, the Department of Justice’s final rule on communications by DOJ 
attorneys with represented persons151 (now repealed) did two distinct things: 
It set forth a federal rule of professional ethics, and it “preempt[ed] and su-
persede[d] the application of state laws and rules . . . to the extent that they 
relate to contacts by attorneys for the government, and those acting at their 
direction or under their supervision, with represented parties or represented 
persons in criminal or civil law enforcement investigations or proceed-
ings.”152  The second aspect of the rule—its preemptive effect—went well 
beyond preempting only those state rules in direct conflict with the federal 
pronouncement; rather, the DOJ rule was “designed to preempt the entire 
field of rules concerning such contacts.”153  This sort of preemptive author-
ity is not necessary in order to allow federal agencies to act at all; rather, it 
is an additional power that operates on state law beyond the scope of the 
agency’s substantive actions themselves.154  A constitutional rule foreclos-
ing this power would be perfectly consistent with permitting broader forms 
of express and implied preemption emanating from the underlying statute 
itself.  But the agency would not have its own freestanding powers of ex-
press and implied preemption, aside from the preemption necessary to give 
its own substantive actions effect as supreme federal law.  Such a rule 
would not be without its line-drawing difficulties, but it seems no less ad-
ministrable than many other rules of constitutional law. 
A different sort of limit would focus on the clarity with which Con-
gress has delegated the authority to take preemptive action.  Such a limit 
might take either of two forms, which parallel the distinction just discussed 
between agency authority to take action that happens to preempt state law 
and independent preemptive authority that goes beyond the supremacy ef-
fect of agency lawmaking.  We might insist that, in order to take action with 
the effect of preempting state law, the agency be exercising authority dele-
 
149  Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985). 
150  In Stephen Gardbaum’s terms, this position would allow agencies to create federal law that is 
supreme in the event of a conflict, but deny to the agency the additional power to preempt or displace 
state law in the absence of such a conflict.  See generally Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 40–43 (distin-
guishing “preemption” from “supremacy”). 
151  Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (Aug. 4, 1994).  A subsequent 
statute mandated that DOJ attorneys comply with state ethical rules.  See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000).  
152  Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. at 39,931. 
153  Id. 
154  See Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 46–48. 
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gated by Congress with a heightened degree of clarity.  If that rule were too 
broad, as it might be, we might instead insist that any independent preemp-
tive authority must be clearly delegated to the agency by Congress.  In par-
ticular, such a rule would require that the preempting agency point to some 
delegation more specific than a general grant of authority like the FCC’s 
“necessary and proper clause” quoted previously.155 
This sort of clarity requirement would be consistent with the general 
drift of the modern delegation doctrine, which tends not to impose hard lim-
its on congressional delegations but rather manifests in various “nondelega-
tion canons” of statutory construction.156  It would also be consistent with 
the most recent turn in the Court’s federalism clear statement jurisprudence 
in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers (SWANCC).157  That case involved the Corps’ “migratory bird rule,” 
an interpretation of the Corps’ delegated authority to protect wetlands under 
the Clean Water Act that extended the Corps’ jurisdiction to all waters used 
by migratory birds.158  Confronted with what it deemed a close question 
concerning whether the rule exceeded the federal commerce power, the 
Court instead held that the Corps’ rule exceeded the scope of its delegated 
authority: 
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of 
Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that re-
sult. . . .  This requirement stems from our prudential desire not to needlessly 
reach constitutional issues and our assumption that Congress does not casually 
authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of con-
gressional authority. . . .  This concern is heightened where the administrative 
interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal en-
croachment upon a traditional state power.159 
This sort of nondelegation canon, like the basic presumption against pre-
emption itself, is a resistance norm: It raises the threshold for congressional 
delegations of authority that encroach on state autonomy, without attempt-
ing to set a hard limit on such delegations.  A clear statement requirement 
for delegations of independent preemptive authority would protect similar 
values of state autonomy in a similar way. 
 
155  See supra note 137. 
156  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000) 
(“Rather than having been abandoned, the [nondelegation] doctrine has merely been renamed and relo-
cated.  Its current home consists of a set of nondelegation canons, which forbid executive agencies from 
making certain decisions on their own.”). 
157  531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
158  See id. at 163–64.  The rule itself may be found at Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the 
Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).  
159  SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172–73.  In support of this reasoning, the Court cited the rule favoring 
statutory constructions that avoid constitutional doubts.  Id. at 173 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. 
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
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A fallback position would not require Congress to address preemption 
specifically, but would limit the scope of agency preemption powers in pre-
cisely the same way that current doctrine limits the scope of Chevron defer-
ence.  In Christensen v. Harris County160 and United States v. Mead 
Corp.,161 the Supreme Court held that Chevron deference applies only where 
Congress has delegated authority to act, and the agency has in fact acted, 
with the “force of law.”162  This rule means that the most authoritative 
agency actions will generally be taken through procedures, such as notice 
and comment rulemaking, that foster deliberation; moreover, the require-
ment that such authority be specially delegated raises the threshold for such 
delegations.163  Both these aspects of Christensen and Mead seem equally 
salutary in preemption situations.  Procedures such as notice and comment 
offer some opportunity for state governmental input into the rulemaking 
process, both directly and through federal representatives.  The additional 
burdens imposed on the agency by such procedures, moreover, increase the 
enactment costs of preemptive regulation.164  And a heightened delegation 
threshold will reduce the sheer number of instances in which courts find 
preemptive authority.165 
A final, minimal requirement would not limit the ability of Congress to 
delegate preemptive authority to agencies at all, but rather would insist that 
the agency actually exercise that authority before preemption can be found.  
One might think such an obvious requirement would go without saying.  
But in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,166 the Court held (unani-
mously) that the mere delegation of authority to the President to preempt 
state trade sanctions signaled that such sanctions were in conflict with fed-
eral policy, even though the President had not actually exercised his pre-
 
160  529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
161  533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
162  Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 467 (2002) (exploring the history of judicial interpretation of agency preemption); Sunstein, supra 
note 91. 
163  See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates adminis-
trative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure 
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”). 
164  Cf. Stephenson, supra note 46 (describing ways in which increasing enactment costs may protect 
constitutional values). 
165  Mead and Christensen have created difficult line-drawing questions of their own because it is 
not always easy to distinguish between congressional delegations of authority to make legislative rules, 
on the one hand, and merely interpretive rules, on the other.  See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 222 (com-
plaining that “the ‘force of law’ test introduces considerable complexity into the Chevron analysis”).  
For one effort to recover a convention for interpreting Congress’s intent on this question, see generally 
Merrill & Watts, supra note 162.  The important point for my purposes, however, is that Chevron al-
ready requires this difficult line-drawing enterprise.  The limit on executive preemption proposed here 
would thus require no new doctrinal formula for preemption cases; preemption analysis would instead 
piggyback on Chevron doctrine. 
166  530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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emptive authority.167  That result has to be wrong.168  When an executive of-
ficial acts to preempt state law, she is not accountable to the states in the 
same way as a senator or a representative, but some level of political ac-
countability remains.  Indeed, the likely reason that the President had not 
acted to preempt Massachusetts’s sanctions on Burma in Crosby is that such 
an action would have been politically unpopular, perhaps especially with 
Massachusetts’s own senators, who were important supporters of the Presi-
dent.  That is simply the political safeguards of federalism at work.  To say 
that the mere delegation of authority to act can have preemptive effect, 
without requiring a political decision to act for which the Executive may be 
held accountable, is to disembowel the notion of process federalism en-
tirely. 
The last point is that the possibility of preemptive agency action is not 
without its potential upside for state autonomy.  One of the best arguments 
for broad implied conflict and obstacle preemption is that it is difficult for 
Congress both to predict the potential conflicts with state law that may arise 
and to revisit the statutory text if courts underprotect the congressional pur-
pose.  That concern recedes somewhat if a federal administrative agency is 
positioned to respond with explicit action to unforeseen conflicts.  In Hills-
borough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,169 for example, 
the Court rejected an argument that local regulations on blood plasma dona-
tions should be held preempted on the ground that they threatened the na-
tional plasma supply.  The Court relied in part on its assumption that, if 
those local regulations turned out to be more burdensome than the Court 
expected, the Food and Drug Administration could then issue new preemp-
tive regulations.  According to the Court, “the FDA possesses the authority 
to promulgate regulations pre-empting local legislation that imperils the 
supply of plasma and can do so with relative ease.”170  If the availability of 
agency preemption prompted courts to ease up on conflict and obstacle pre-
emption more generally, then the agency role might yield significant bene-
fits for state autonomy.  Unfortunately, there seems to be little evidence—
Hillsborough itself aside—that the potential for agency preemption has this 
effect. 
 
167  See id. at 388; see also Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 45, at 168–77 (criticizing this as-
pect of the preemption argument in Crosby). 
168  It would be unfair to suggest that the existence of the unused delegations was the only argument 
for preemption in Crosby.  See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 377–80 (employing a more traditional statutory pre-
emption argument).   But it does seem to have played an important role in the analysis.  See generally 
Edward T. Swaine, Crosby as Foreign Relations Law, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 481 (2001) (reading Crosby’s 
preemption analysis as strongly influenced by more general concerns about state involvement in foreign 
affairs).   My argument is that such a delegation ought not to count at all—or indeed count against pre-
emption, as I explain below—until it is actually exercised. 
169  471 U.S. 707 (1985). 
170  Id. at 721. 
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CONCLUSION 
Executive preemption represents a major threat to state autonomy.  It is 
a threat, moreover, that the dominant paradigm of contemporary federalism 
doctrine—relying as it does on political and procedural safeguards in Con-
gress—is ill-equipped to combat.  Because of the widely perceived need for 
agency action, on the one hand, and the wide variety of ways in which 
agencies act, on the other, we are unlikely to find any single doctrinal for-
mulation that can reconcile agency preemption with process federalism.  In-
stead, I have tried to offer a series of limiting options of varying structure 
and efficacy.  What will not work, however, is for the Court to continue to 
pretend that every federal agency action is equivalent to a congressional 
statute for purposes of preemption analysis. 
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